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Abstract
We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and can-
didates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the
voters’ preferences over candidates. In the voting, each voter is asked to submit her favorite
candidate. Given the collection of favorite candidates, a mechanism for eliminating the least
popular candidate finds a committee containing all candidates but the one to be eliminated.
Each committee is associated with a social value that is the sum of the costs (utilities) it
imposes (provides) to the voters. We design mechanisms for finding a committee to optimize
the social value. We measure the quality of a mechanism by its distortion, defined as the
worst-case ratio between the social value of the committee found by the mechanism and the
optimal one. We establish new upper and lower bounds on the distortion of mechanisms in this
single-candidate voting, for both general metrics and well-motivated special cases.
1 Introduction
In social choice theory, a mechanism (also referred to as a voting rule) aggregates the preferences
of multiple voters over a set of candidates, and returns a k-element subset of candidates as a winning
committee. An appealing approach to dealing with social choice problems is embedding the input
“election” into a metric space, i.e., each participant is represented by a point in a metric space,
and voters prefer candidates that are closer to them to the ones that are further away. This spatial
model has very natural interpretations. For example, in a 2-dimensional Euclidean space, each
dimension specifies a political issue (such as military or education), and the position of a voter or
candidate identifies the extent to which the individual supports the issues. Recently, this model
has attracted attentions from AI researchers, see, e.g., [2, 9, 1].
The mechanisms in many of the works aforementioned ask each voter for a linear order over
candidates. On the other hand, one may note that eliciting so much information on the preferences
casts a high burden on the selection rules, and often impairs the privacy of voters. The simplicity,
which means that each voter is only required to provide a small amount of information, is often a
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desideratum for good mechanisms. In this paper, we study the single-candidate vote mechanisms
(named by [10]), scv mechanisms for short, that ask each voter to cast a vote of a single candidate.
In addition to the top choices of voters, we further assume that the locations of candidates in
the metric space are known to the mechanism, while the voters’ private locations and numerical
preferences are inaccessible, since every political candidate in a typical election should fully an-
nounce her opinions on all issues, and thus her location in the space is public information. For
example, in the facility location scenario, the city authority, who plans to locate some facilities
on a street or a plane, predetermines the potential locations of facilities, based on the landscape,
resources and distributions of social communities.
As voters’ preferences are specified by their distances to candidates, it is natural to quantify the
quality of a committee by the associated distances. We evaluate the performance of a mechanism
in the standard worst-case analysis benchmark (introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein [16]),
which defines the distortion of a mechanism to be the worst-case ratio between the quality of a
committee selected by this mechanism and that of the optimal committee selected by an omniscient
mechanism.
Previous work was mainly concerned about the single-winner elections. In this paper, we focus
on the antithesis, the multi-winner elections that eliminate the least popular candidate, that is, se-
lect a committee containing all candidates but one. These can be regarded as single-loser elections,
which are well motivated. For example, some enterprises adopt a last-out mechanism in the per-
sonnel performance appraisal system, which dismisses the employee with the lowest performance in
a department each year. Some voting rules in TV talent shows iteratively eliminate one candidate
at each time to obtain the final winners.
Our Contributions.
Let m be the number of candidates in the election, and W be the winning committee of size
m − 1 selected by a mechanism. We discuss the distortion of mechanisms under two objectives:
minimizing the social cost and maximizing the social utility. In the former case, each voter takes
the distance to W (i.e., the smallest distance between her and a candidate in W ) as her cost, and
the social cost of W is the sum of its distances to all voters. In the latter case, each voter takes her
distance to the eliminated candidate (i.e., the one not in W ) as her utility, and the social utility of
W is the total utility of voters.
In Section 3, we study the distortion of scv mechanisms under the social cost objective. We
prove that if the exact locations of the candidates are known, then a simple deterministic mechanism
which minimizes the so-called projection distance achieves a distortion of 3, and no deterministic
one can do better. In other words, we can compute a 3-approximate solution as long as the input
votes are consistent with the true distances, i.e., each vote is indeed a candidate closest to the voter.
The most interesting contribution is a randomized scv mechanism with distortion 3 − 2m , which
selects each eligible committee with a carefully designed probability. We prove that no randomized
mechanism has a distortion better than 3− 2m , matching the upper bound. The deterministic and
randomized mechanisms also satisfy strategy-proofness, guaranteeing that each selfish voter always
acts truthfully. Moreover, the lower bounds 3 and 3 − 2m hold even if the voters submit a full
preference ranking over all the candidates.
Section 4 focuses on the social utility objective. We show the lower bounds 3 and 1.5 for
deterministic and randomized mechanisms, respectively. While the deterministic mechanism that
maximizes the projection distance gives a distortion 3 for general metrics, we investigate randomized
scv mechanisms for elections in several widely-studied special spaces, e.g., the simplex (where the
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distance between any two candidates is the same) and the real line (1-Euclidean space). The simplex
setting corresponds to the case when candidates share no similarities, i.e., when all candidates are
equally different from each other, and the real line is also a well-studied and well-motivated special
case.
These results are summarized in Table 1, where LB and UB are shorthands for lower bound
and upper bound on the distortion of scv mechanisms.
Table 1: A summary of our results
Objective Deterministic Randomized
Social cost
LB: 3 (Prop.3.1) LB: 3− 2m (Prop.3.2)
UB: 3 (Thm.3.3) UB: 3− 2m (Thm.3.5)
Social utility
LB: 3 (Prop.4.1)
LB: 1.5 (Prop.4.1)
UB: 3 (Thm.4.2)
UB: 3- 4m+2 (Simplex, Thm.4.5)
13/7 (Line, Thm.4.6)
In Section 5, we extend our results to a more general setting, where the scv mechanism is
required to select a committee of size k, for a predetermined integer k ≤ m− 1. We prove that the
simple idea that optimizes the projection distance can achieve a distortion 3 for both the social cost
objective and the social utility objective, and no deterministic mechanism can do better. Then we
conclude this paper with future research directions.
Related Work.
In social choice theory, Procaccia and Rosenschein [16] propose a utilitarian approach – the
implicit utilitarian voting– by assuming that voters have latent cardinal utilities and report ordinal
preferences induced by them. They measure the performance of popular voting rules by the notion
of distortion. Subsequently, Caragiannis and Procaccia [7], Oren and Lucier [15], Boutilier et al.
[6], Bhaskar and Ghosh [5] employ this notion and design selection rules with low distortions.
Anshelevich et al. [2] first embed the election into a metric space, in which the participants
are points, and the costs are driven by the distances. They study mechanisms that know only
the voters’ preference rankings over candidates, but not the underlying metric, and output a single
winner. Regarding the objective of minimizing the social cost of the winner, they show the Copeland
rule has distortion 5, and prove a lower bound 3 for the distortion of deterministic mechanisms.
Later, Skowron and Elkind [17] show that the class of scoring rules and STV have super-constant
distortion. The work of [11] proves that the ranking pairs rule has distortion at least 5. Recently,
Munagala and Wang [14] improve the distortion to 4.236, using a weighted tournament rule.
In addition to deterministic rules, randomized rules have also been considered. Random dicta-
torship that randomly selects the top choice of one of the n voters gets distortion 3 − 2/n [10, 3].
Feldman et al. [10] consider scv mechanisms and strategy-proofness in the metric setting, and
propose a 2-distortion mechanism on the real line. The work of [12] proposes a very simple mech-
anism that randomly asks voters for their favorite candidates until two voters agree, achieving low
distortion and satisfying some normative properties.
The most related setting to ours appears in [4], where the candidates’ locations are additionally
assumed to be known. With this extra location information, they break the best-known upper
bound 4.236 mentioned above and present a deterministic 3-distortion scv mechanism for single-
winner election.
3
2 Model
Let Ω = (S, d) be a metric space, where S is the space and d : S × S → R+ is the metric. The
distance between w ∈ S and V ⊆ S is defined as d(w, V ) := minv∈V d(w, v). Let N = {1, . . . , n} be
the set of voters (agents), each of whom is located at a private point in S. The location xi of voter
i ∈ N is her type, and the location profile of all voters is x = (x1, . . . , xn). Let M = {y1, . . . , ym}
be the set of candidates (alternatives), each of whom is located at a public point in S. We refer to
yj as the j-th candidate and as her location interchangeably.
The voter prefers the closer candidate, and the nearest candidate is the favorite. Each voter
i ∈ N is asked to submit a single nearest candidate, called her action and denoted by ai ∈M . The
collection of voters’ actions is the action profile a = (a1, . . . , an). An election in the social choice
problem under consideration is a triple Γ = (Ω,M,a). We call a location profile x consistent with
election Γ, if each voter’s action reveals her real preference, that is, ai ∈ arg miny∈M d(xi, y), for
every i ∈ N . Denote by χ(Γ) the set of location profiles consistent with Γ.
We are concerned with mechanisms that, given an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), select a committee
(subset of M) of cardinality m − 1 as winners. It is assumed that the mechanisms have full
information on the metric space Ω and candidate locations M , but they do not know the location
profile of voters. Associate each y ∈ M with the potential committee My := M \ {y}. Let
K = {My : y ∈M} denote the set of potential committees. A randomized mechanism is a function
f that maps every action profile a ∈Mn to a random committee f(a) that follows some probability
distribution over the potential committees in K. A deterministic mechanism f simply selects a
specific committee f(a) ∈ K with probability 1.
We investigate the performance of mechanisms from the utilitarian perspective, which involves
the objectives of minimizing the social cost and maximizing the social utility, respectively.
The social cost objective. Given location profile x = (xi)i∈N and committee Y ∈ K, the cost
of voter i ∈ N is the distance to the nearest winner, i.e., d(xi, Y ). The social cost of Y , denoted
as SC(Y,x) or SC(Y ) for short, equals
∑
i∈N d(xi, Y ). We use OPTc(x) to denote the social cost
of an optimal committee selected by an omniscient mechanism, i.e., OPTc(x) = minY ∈K SC(Y,x).
The distortion of a (randomized) mechanism f on an election Γ = (Ω,M,a) is
dist(f,Γ) = sup
x∈χ(Γ)
E[SC(f(a),x)]
OPTc(x)
.
In other words, it is the worst-case — over the location profiles consistent with Γ — ratio between
the expected social cost of the committee selected by the mechanism and the optimal social cost.
The social utility objective. Given location profile x and committee My, the utility of voter
i equals the d(xi, y) to the loser y. The social utility of My, denoted as SU(My,x) or SU(My) for
short, equals
∑
i∈N d(xi, y). The optimal social utility is OPTu(x) = maxY ∈K SU(Y,x), and the
distortion of a (randomized) mechanism f on election Γ is
dist(f,Γ) = sup
x∈χ(Γ)
OPTu(x)
E[SU(f(a),x)]
.
For either of the objectives, we define the distortion of a mechanism f asDist(f) = supΓ dist(f,Γ)
by taking the worst case over elections. We call f an r-distortion mechanism if Dist(f) ≤ r.
Strategy-proofness. As in many previous works on social choice, we evaluate the quality of a
mechanism under the assumption that the underlying location profile is always consistent with the
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elections, i.e., the voters act truthfully and submit their nearest candidates. Nevertheless, possibly
some voter may use a strategy (that leads to an action and consequently an election with which
the location profile may not be consistent) to be better off. A mechanism is strategy-proof, if the
truth-telling strategy is always optimal for each voter, that is, voting for any one of the nearest
candidates can always optimize her (expected) cost or utility, regardless of the actions of others.
3 Mechanisms for Minimum Social Cost
This section focuses on the objective of minimizing the social cost. We first show the lower bounds
on distortion, and propose both deterministic and randomized mechanisms that match the lower
bounds.
3.1 Lower Bounds
We prove lower bounds on the distortion of both deterministic and randomized mechanisms by
constructing election instances. Our construction is based on the well-known worst case of single-
winner election [2, 10], in which two candidates locate at 0 and 2 on the real line respectively, and
each receive a vote. We extend it to our setting by adding m−2 very far candidates, each of whom
also receives a vote. Then any mechanism with guaranteed performance must weed out either the
candidate locating at 0 or the one at 2; while either option results in a distortion 3.
Proposition 3.1. For any m ≥ 2 and the social cost objective, the distortion of any deterministic
scv mechanism cannot be smaller than 3.
Proof. Consider an election Γ in R, where m candidates are located at y1 = 0, y2 = 2, y3 =
L, y4 = 2L, . . . , ym = (m − 2)L for a large number L, and the action profile of n = m voters is
a = (0, 2, L, 2L, . . . , (m− 2)L).
It is easy to see that any mechanism f with bounded distortion must eliminate either y1 or y2. If
y1 ∈ f(a), then for the location profile x = (1, 2, L, 2L, . . . , (m−2)L) ∈ χ(Γ), we have SC(f(a),x) =
3, and OPTc(x) = 1 (realized by the optimal committee My1), indicating the distortion at least 3.
If y2 ∈ f(a), the same bound holds for location profile (0, 1, L, 2L, . . . , (m− 2)L).
Although the example constructed above can provide a lower bound 2 for the distortion of
randomized scv mechanism, we prove a better lower bound in the following.
Proposition 3.2. For the social cost objective, the distortion of any randomized scv mechanism
cannot be smaller than 3− 2m .
Proof. Consider an election Γ = (Ω,M,a) with d(yi, yj) = 2 for any pair of distinct candidates
yi, yj ∈ M . There are n = m voters, and the action profile is a = (y1, y2, . . . , ym), that is, each
candidate receives a vote from one voter. Since there are in total m potential committees, any
randomized mechanism f must select some committee My with a probability no more than
1
m . By
symmetry, we can assume w.l.o.g. that Pr[f(a) = Mym ] ≤ 1m .
Now consider the location profile x = (y1, y2, . . . , ym−1, xm), where the point xm is at the same
distance d(xm, yi) = 1 from every candidate yi ∈M . Obviously, suitable choice of Ω,M and xm can
fulfill all the conditions (i.e., the distances specified satisfy the metric condition), and guarantees
that x is consistent with Γ. (Figure 1 depicts an example for m = 3.) The optimal committee is
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Mym with optimal social cost OPTc(x) = d(xm,Mym) = 1, while any other committee Myi with
i ≤ m− 1 has a social cost at least d(xm,Myi) + d(yi,Myi) = 1 + 2 = 3. Thus, the expected social
cost of the random committee f(a) is E[SC(f(a),x)] ≥ 1mOPTc(x) + (1− 1m)3 = 3− 2m , showing
that the distortion of f is at least 3− 2m .
y1
y2y3
x3
2 2
2
1
1 1
Figure 1: Three candidates are indicated by hollow circles, three voters are indicated by solid
disks. Each candidate receives a vote. The numbers near edges indicate the distances, which
are not Euclidean. The point x3 is at distance 1 from every candidate, and the optimal solution
eliminates y3.
It is worth pointing out that the two election examples constructed in the proofs of Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 can be applied to the election that asks each voter to submit a preference ranking. Thus
the lower bounds in these two proportions also hold for the mechanisms that aggregate voters’
rankings over candidates.
3.2 Projection Mechanism
Given an action profile a = (ai)i∈N , it can be viewed as a projection of the location profile of voters
to the location set of candidates. For any subset W ⊆ M , we define its projection distance w.r.t.
a as pda(W ) :=
∑
i∈N d(ai,W ). In the remainder of this paper, we use d(i, V ) instead of d(xi, V )
for i ∈ N and V ⊆ S, when the context is clear. Now we are ready to present a deterministic
mechanism which ensures distortion 3 matching the lower bound in Proposition 3.1, by selecting a
committee that minimizes the projection distance.
Mechanism 1 (Min-Projection-Distance). Given an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), mechanism f
deterministically outputs a committee f(a) with the smallest projection distance, that is, f(a) ∈
argminMy :y∈Mpda(My); ties are broken arbitrarily.
The spirit of this mechanism is treating the action of each voter as her location.
Theorem 3.3. Min-Projection-Distance is a deterministic, strategy-proof, polynomial-time
and 3-distortion scv mechanism for the social cost objective.
Proof. The polynomial-time computability is straightforward since the number of possible commit-
tees is |K| = m.
For the strategy-proofness, we show that the truth-telling strategy always gives each voter a
minimum cost. Suppose action ai is a nearest candidate of voter i, and a
′
i ∈ M \ {ai} is another
arbitrary action. Given the actions a−i of other voters, consider the action profiles a = (ai,a−i) and
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a′ = (a′i,a−i). The output of the mechanism is f(a) = Y ∈ argminMypda(My) and f(a′) = Y ′ ∈
argminMypda′(My). We only need to consider the case where Y 6= Y ′. If ai ∈ Y , the cost of voter
i is minimized when she tells the truth. So we assume ai /∈ Y , which along with k = m− 1 implies
ai ∈ Y ′. If a′i ∈ Y ′, the projection distance of Y on a′ is pda′(Y ) = pda(Y )− d(ai, Y ) < pda(Y ) ≤
pda(Y
′), and the projection distance of Y ′ on a′ is pda′(Y ′) = pda(Y ′) since both ai and a′i are in Y ′.
So we have pda′(Y ) < pda′(Y
′), which contradicts the selection rule of the mechanism, and reduces
to the case of ai ∈ Y ′ \ Y and a′i ∈ Y \ Y ′. Now we have pda′(Y ′) > pda(Y ′) ≥ pda(Y ) > pda′(Y ),
which also contradicts the selection rule. Therefore, voter i’s cost when reporting ai is always no
more than her cost when reporting any a′i, which proves the strategy-proofness.
Given election Γ and any consistent location profile x = (xi)i∈N ∈ χ(Γ), let Y ∗ be the optimal
committee, and Y be the output by the mechanism. Then
SC(Y )
SC(Y ∗)
=
∑
i∈N d(xi, Y )∑
i∈N d(xi, Y ∗)
≤
∑
i∈N d(xi, ai)∑
i∈N d(xi, Y ∗)
+
∑
i∈N d(ai, Y )∑
i∈N d(xi, Y ∗)
≤ 1 +
∑
i∈N d(ai, Y )∑
i∈N d(xi, Y ∗)
.
For every i ∈ N , recalling from the consistency that d(xi, ai) = miny∈M d(xi, y) ≤ d(xi, Y ∗), we
have 2d(xi, Y
∗) ≥ d(xi, Y ∗) + d(xi, ai) ≥ d(ai, Y ∗). Therefore
SC(Y )
SC(Y ∗)
≤ 1 +
∑
i∈N d(ai, Y )
1
2
∑
i∈N d(ai, Y ∗)
= 1 +
2pda(Y )
pda(Y ∗)
≤ 3,
where the last inequality is guaranteed by the selection rule of the mechanism.
3.3 Power-Proportionality Mechanism
Inspired by [3], we establish in the following, for any given randomized scv mechanism and location
profile, an upper bound on the ratio between the expected social cost of the committee selected
by the mechanism, and the optimal social cost. With the help of this upper bound, we design a
randomized scv mechanism, and prove its strategy-proofness and distortion (which matches the
lower bound in Proposition 3.2).
Before presenting the formal description of the upper bound, we make a partition of the voter
set according to voters’ actions. Given an action profile a = (ai)i∈N , for each candidate y ∈M , let
Na,y = {i ∈ N |ai = y} denote the subset of voters whose actions are y. Then (Na,y)y∈M forms a
partition of N .
Lemma 3.4. Given a randomized scv mechanism and an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), suppose the
probability that the mechanism selects each My ∈ K as winners is P (My). Then, for any location
profile x ∈ χ(Γ) and any optimal committee My∗ with y∗ ∈M , the following holds:∑
y∈M P (My)SC(My)
SC(My∗)
(1)
≤1 + 2
∑
y 6=y∗ P (My)|Na,y|d(y,My)
|Na,y∗ |d(y∗,My∗) .
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Proof. For each voter i ∈ N , note that i ∈ Na,ai and (from the consistency of x) that ai is a nearest
candidate for i. If y ∈M \ {ai}, i.e., i ∈ N \Na,y, then ai ∈My. For every committee My 6= My∗ ,
notice that the candidate y belongs to My∗ , giving d(y,My∗) = 0. So, the social cost of My with
y 6= y∗ is upper bounded by
SC(My,x)
=
∑
i∈N\Na,y
d(xi,My) +
∑
i∈Na,y
d(xi,My)
≤
∑
i∈N\Na,y
d(xi,My∗) +
∑
i∈Na,y
(d(xi, y) + d(y,My))
= SC(My∗ ,x) + |Na,y|d(y,My).
Since 2d(xi,My∗) ≥ d(xi, ai) + d(xi,My∗) ≥ d(ai,My∗) for every i ∈ N , the optimal social cost is
lower bounded by
SC(My∗ ,x) =
∑
i∈N
d(xi,My∗)
≥
∑
i∈N
d(ai,My∗)
2
=
1
2
∑
y∈M
|Na,y|d(y,My∗)
=
1
2
|Na,y∗ |d(y∗,My∗).
The above two bounds give the following estimate on the ratio of the expected social cost of the
committee output by the mechanism to the optimum:∑
y∈M P (My)SC(My ,x)
SC(My∗ ,x)
= P (My∗) +
∑
y∈M\{y∗} P (My)SC(My ,x)
SC(My∗ ,x)
≤ P (My∗) +
∑
y∈M\{y∗} P (My)(SC(My∗ ,x)+|Na,y |d(y,My))
SC(My∗ ,x)
≤ 1 + 2
∑
y∈M\{y∗} P (My)|Na,y |d(y,My)
|Na,y∗ |d(y∗,My∗ ) ,
which proves the lemma.
A natural idea to design a mechanism is making the right hand side of inequality (1) as small as
possible. Next, we seek a suitable mechanism whose probabilities of winning set selections achieve
this goal.
Mechanism 2 (Power-Proportionality). Given an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), for every com-
mittee My ∈ K, the winning probability is
P (My) =
|Na,y|−md(y,My)−m∑
z∈M |Na,z|−md(z,Mz)−m
. (2)
Theorem 3.5. Power-Proportionality is a randomized scv mechanism that is strategy-proof
and has distortion at most 3− 2m for social cost objective.
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Proof. As
∑
y∈M P (My) = 1, the probability distribution is well-defined. To see the strategy-
proofness, consider any location profile x and an arbitrary voter i, one of whose nearest candidates
being y. It is easy to see that, i voting for y (in comparison with not doing so) increases the size
of Na,y, and decreases the probability P (My). The expected cost of voter i is P (My)d(xi,My) +
(1 − P (My))d(xi, y). Since d(xi, y) ≤ d(xi,My), the truth-telling strategy always minimizes her
expected cost, which indicates the strategy-proofness.
Next, we investigate the distortion w.r.t. x ∈ χ(Γ). By Lemma 3.4, substituting the probability
(2) into inequality (1), we have∑
y∈M P (My)SC(My,x)
SC(My∗ ,x)
(3)
≤1 + 2
∑
y∈M\{y∗} |Na,y|1−md(y,My)1−m
|Na,y∗ |d(y∗,My∗)∑y∈M |Na,y|−md(y,My)−m .
Now we compute the maximum value of the right hand side in (3) by the function g : Rm+ → R,
g(α1, . . . , αm) = 1 +
2α1
∑m
i=2 α
m−1
i∑m
i=1 α
m
i
.
By the derivative of this function, we know that the maximum value is attained when α1 = · · · = αm,
that is, max g(α1, . . . , αm) = g(α1, . . . , α1) = 3− 2m . The right hand side of (3) has the same form
as g, and it is also at most 3− 2m , which gives the upper bound of the distortion.
4 Mechanisms for Maximum Social Utility
In this section, we focus on the social utility objective. Each voter targets a favorite candidate,
and takes the distance to the eliminated candidate as her utility, as she wants to stay as far away
from the nuisance as possible.
By a simple adaptation to the proof of Proposition 3.1, one can easily obtain the following lower
bounds for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms.
Proposition 4.1. For the social utility objective, no deterministic (resp. randomized) scv mecha-
nism can have a distortion smaller than 3 (resp. 1.5).
We present in Section 4.1 a deterministic svc mechanism with distortion 3, using a dual idea of
Mechanism 1. Then, we provide in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 randomized mechanisms for some important
special metric spaces.
4.1 Projection Mechanism
Recall that the projection distance of candidate y ∈M on an action profile a = (ai)i∈N is pda(y) =∑
i∈N d(ai, y). We follow the dual spirit of Mechanism 1 to select a committee with the eliminated
candidate maximizing the projection distance.
Mechanism 3 (Max-Projection-Distance). Given an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), the determin-
istic mechanism f outputs committee My where y has the largest projection distance on a, that is,
y ∈ arg maxw∈M pda(w) and f(a) = My, breaking ties arbitrarily.
The following 3-distortion performance guarantee can be proved by an argument that is com-
pletely symmetrical with the proof of Theorem 3.3.
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Theorem 4.2. Max-Projection-Distance is a deterministic polynomial-time 3-distortion scv
mechanism for the social utility objective.
This 3-distortion scv mechanism is the best that one can expect for deterministic mechanisms,
in view of Proposition 4.1. In contrast to Mechanism 1, it is not strategy-proof: When a voter has
two favorite candidates and votes for them respectively, resulting in different action profiles, the
corresponding outputs of Max-Projection-Distance may be two candidates that have different
distances to her. Therefore, to maximize her utility, she has to vote for the specific candidate who
leads to a better outcome.
4.2 Proportionality Mechanism
A natural idea for randomization is selecting a committee in K with a probability proportional to
the number of voters who vote for it. We show the strategy-proofness, and evaluate the distortion
in the two-candidate case and simplex case.
Recall that Na,y = {i ∈ N |ai = y} is the set of voters who vote for the candidate y ∈M .
Mechanism 4 (Proportionality). Given an election Γ = (Ω,M,a), for each committee My,
y ∈M , the winning probability is
P (My) =
n− |Na,y|
(m− 1)n .
Note that the probability distribution is well-defined, as the sum of n − |Na,y| over y ∈ M is
(m− 1)n.
Lemma 4.3. Proportionality is strategy-proof.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary voter i ∈ N , and suppose y ∈ M is her favorite candidate. If
voter i switches her action from y to any other y′ ∈ My, then the probability P (My) increases,
P (My′) decreases, and all other probabilities remain the same. The expected utility of voter i is
P (My)d(xi, y) + P (My′)d(xi, y
′) + U with a fixed value U . Since d(xi, y) ≤ d(xi, y′), this implies
that the expected utility is non-increasing by switching from y to y′. Therefore, being truthful is
the optimal strategy, regardless of the actions of other voters.
By an analysis similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4, we obtain a lower bound on the ratio between
the expected social utility of the selection and the optimal utility.
Lemma 4.4. Given a single-winner election Γ = (Ω,M,a) and location profile x ∈ χ(Γ), suppose
My∗ is an optimal committee. For any randomized mechanism that selects My (y ∈M) as winning
committee with probability P (My), the expected social utility satisfies∑
y∈M P (My)SU(My)
SU(My∗)
≥ 1−
∑
y∈My∗
P (My)
Ç
1 +
∑
z∈M |Na,z|d(z, y)
2(n− |Na,y∗ |)d(y, y∗)
å−1
.
With the help of Lemma 4.4, we can upper bound the distortion of Proportionality in the
2-candidate case (i.e., m = 2) and simplex case. We say the candidates form a simplex, if the
distance between any two candidates is the same, say 2, i.e., d(y, z) = 2 for all distinct y, z ∈M .1
1The simplex is studied in [3] for single-winner election, under some additional assumption on distances.
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Theorem 4.5. For the social utility objective, Proportionality has distortion
(i) at most 1.523 when m = 2;
(ii) at most 3− 4m+2 when candidates form a simplex.
Proof. (i) For any election Γ and consistent location profile x ∈ χ(Γ), suppose y is the optimal
candidate (singleton committee), and y∗ is the other one. By Lemma 4.4, we have
P (y)SU(y) + P (y∗)SU(y∗)
SU(y)
≥ 1− P (y∗)
Ç
1 +
|Na,y∗ |
2(n− |Na,y∗ |)
å−1
= 1− |Na,y∗ |
n
Ç
1 +
|Na,y∗ |
2(n− |Na,y∗ |)
å−1
= 1−
Ç
n
|Na,y∗ | +
n
2(n− |Na,y∗ |)
å−1
≥ 1−
Ä
1.5 +
√
2
ä−1
Therefore, the distortion is at most (1− (1.5 +√2)−1)−1 = (5 + 4√2)/7 = 1.5224...
(ii) can be proved in a similar but more involved analysis, which is relegated to Supplementary
Material.
4.3 Mechanisms on the Real Line
We now consider the case where all voters and candidates are located on the real line, and the metric
is defined as the Euclidean distance. This setting simulates the scenario in which an authority
wants to build a facility on a street, and has been extensively studied for obnoxious facility games.
The results of [8] implies that an optimal committee must eliminate one of the two endpoints of
the line segment spanned by y1, . . . , ym. This nice fact directly provides a randomized strategy-
proof 2-distortion mechanism that eliminates the leftmost candidate and the rightmost candidate
with probability 12 , respectively. Next, we improve the distortion by a more involved probability
distribution of selection, at a cost of losing the strategy-proofness.
Mechanism 5 (Left-or-Right). Given an election Γ = (R,M,a), where the leftmost and
rightmost candidate are located at y1 = 0 and ym = L, respectively. Denote by n1, n2 the number
of voters whose actions are on [0, L2 ], (
L
2 , L] , respectively. Select Myi with probability P (Myi),
i = 1,m, as specified below:
• If n1 > n2, then P (My1) = 613 and P (Mym) = 713 .
• If n1 < n2, then P (My1) = 713 and P (Mym) = 613 .
• If n1 = n2, then P (My1) = P (Mym) = 12 .
Theorem 4.6. Left-or-Right is a randomized 137 -distortion scv mechanism for the social utility
objective.
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Proof. For any election Γ = (R,M,a) and consistent location profile x ∈ χ(Γ), we show that
the performance ratio OPTu(x)E[SU(f(a),x)] is upper bounded by
13
7 , where f denotes mechanism Left-or-
Right. It is easy to see that the worst case w.r.t. the performance ratio must occur when all voters
are also located on interval [0, L]. (If some xi is smaller than 0 or larger than L, then changing
it to 0 or L would not decrease the ratio.) So we assume that xi ∈ [0, L] for all i ∈ N , and only
consider the line segment [0, L].
If n1 = n2, then the expected social utility of the outcome is
E[SU(f(a))] = 12SU(My1) +
1
2SU(Mym)
= 12
∑n
i=1 xi +
1
2
∑n
i=1(L− xi) = Ln2 ,
and the optimal social utility is OPTu(x) = max{SU(My1), SU(Mym)}. Since n1 = n2, we have
SU(My1) =
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 34Ln1 + Ln2 = 7Ln8 ,
where SU(My1) reaches the upper bound when n1 voters who vote for the midpoint candidate
L
2
are located at 3L4 , and n2 voters who vote for ym = L are located at L. Similarly, we have
SU(Mym) ≤ 7Ln8 .
Therefore, we have OPTu(x) ≤ 74E[SU(f(a))] < 137 E[SU(f(a))] as desired.
When n1 6= n2, by symmetry, we only discuss the case n1 > n2. Recall that an optimal solution
eliminates either y1 or ym. First, if the optimal committee is My1 , we also have OPTu(x) =∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 34Ln1 + Ln2 by the same reasoning as above. In turn, 34n1 + n2 = n − n14 < 78n gives
OPTu(x) <
7Ln
8 . It follows that
E[SU(f(a))] = 613
∑n
i=1 xi +
7
13
∑n
i=1(L− xi)
= 713Ln− 113
∑n
i=1 xi
> 813OPTu(x)− 113OPTu(x)
= 713OPTu(x).
Next, if the optimal committee is Mym , with  > 0 being infinitesimal, we have
OPTu(x) =
∑n
i=1(L− xi) ≤ Ln1 + 34Ln2 −  < Ln,
where the first inequality holds with equality when n2 voters who vote for
L
2 + 
′ are located at
L
4 + 
′ (′ > 0 being infinitesimal), and n1 voters who vote for y1 = 0 are located at 0. Therefore,
E[SU(f(a))] = 613
∑n
i=1 xi +
7
13
∑n
i=1(L− xi)
= 613Ln+
1
13
∑n
i=1(L− xi)
> 613OPTu(x) +
1
13OPTu(x)
= 713OPTu(x).
The proof is complete.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we are concerned with the scv mechanisms for single-loser election, instead of ranking
mechanisms that ask the ordinal preferences of voters. We study how well, in terms of minimizing
(maximizing) social cost (utility), the mechanisms that only receive the information on top-ranked
candidates can compete with omniscient selection rules. From the worst-case perspective, our re-
sults show that accessing the very limited information is often enough, in view that the performance
guarantees of the mechanisms we propose match the lower bounds which hold even when ranking
preferences are known.
Extension. The good performances of scv mechanisms can be extended to a more general task:
selecting a size-k committee W as winners for a predetermined integer k ≤ m− 1. The voters may
take the distance to the winners’ set W as their costs, or take the distance to the losers’ set M\W
as their utilities. For the social cost (utility) objective, a couple of ideas and results presented in
Sections 3 and 4 can be generalized. Specifically, we obtain the following lower bounds (LB) and
upper bounds (UB) on the distortions of scv mechanisms for selecting a size-k committee:
Objective Deterministic Randomized
Social cost LB = UB = 3 LB: 2
Social utility LB = UB = 3 LB: 1.5
The upper bound 3 for the social cost (utility) objective is guaranteed by outputting a size-k
committee that minimizes the projection distance (whose complement set maximizes the projection
distance). More details could be found in Supplementary Material.
Future direction. Although strategy-proof mechanisms for the single-winner and single-loser
voting have been explored more or less, for the general problem of selecting a size-k committee
by scv rules, so far, to the best of our knowledge, there is no performance-guaranteed mechanism
that is strategy-proof, even for k = 2. This suggests an interesting research direction for scv
mechanism design. Except for the proportional idea employed by Mechanism 2 and 4, the quadratic
proportionality [13, 3] or other proportional probabilities relying on k may be useful.
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